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Introduction
The concept of political resilience remains undertheorized and plagued by definitional ambiguity that complicates its analytical utility amid proliferating global crises. To tackle this, this analysis offers a definition adapted for the context of a foreign policy crisis while drawing from David Easton’s systems theory as a basis for this definition. To make the concept usable, the analysis synthesizes Charles Hermann’s perceptual crisis indicators with Michael Brecher’s evolved foreign policy crisis model across four phases, enhanced by Stephen Walt’s balance-of-threat criteria to better assess perceived value threats. The framework is applied to the 2019-2020 Iran crisis under the Trump administration’s “maximum pressure” policy, a bilateral escalation marked by Qasem Soleimani’s assassination, revealing how the US state maintained institutional functionality and authority despite acute pressures.
Defining Political Resilience
The meaning of political resilience as a term is yet to be clearly defined. Its lack of relevant bibliography and inconsistency in usage make defining it a complex task. The key to solving this issue is defining the meaning of ‘political’. According to David Easton’s approach politics is viewed as a dynamic process which is reliant on “authoritative allocations”. Despite variation in form, the political system utilizes decision-making to channel power into structured outcomes while balancing societal pressures. After a feedback loop with society, the system’s decisions become concrete and “binding” for the entirety of society. Thus, the system remains alive by adapting constantly amid changing expectations (Hanumanthappa, 2023, 14-15).
As decision-making in Easton’s process is primarily institutional, politics becomes closely intertwined with the state through these structures. Institutions serve as the mechanism translating societal influence into enforceable policies, turning the state into the epicenter of where decisions are formulated. Consequently, the essential nature of the ‘political’ is bound to the state itself. This view is reinforced in International Politics where dominant theories treat the state as the primary unit of analysis. Building on this foundation, the ad hoc definition of political resilience in this article is the ability of a state to preserve its core institutions and political authority intact during a crisis.
The Concept of Crisis: Hermann’s Approach
One of the first attempts to define the concept of crisis was made by Charles Hermann. While exploring how international crises affect the internal structure of an organization and how this effect influences their response capacity, the need for exploring the meaning of a crisis arose. Noting the necessity of studying crises and a lack of a fully distinct conceptual clarity, he went on to create a working definition of crisis in the context of an organization by providing the following indicators: 1) high-priority values are under threat, 2) the amount of time for a response is restricted, 3) the crisis is unexpected or unanticipated. These indicators are assessed under the perspective of the organization in question (Hermann, 1963, 61-64).
Later on, Hermann’s concept evolved to adjust to International Politics. The perspective of the organization was replaced with the perspective of the decision-makers and the indicators were updated. “Goals” replaced values in the first indicator, while the third one was defined as including the element of surprise. To aid the measurement of each indicator and enhance the comparability of crises following his concept, Hermann also proposed that each indicator could be a scaled dimension. By combining all of these elements, he formulated a three-dimensional visualization of an international crisis in the shape of a cube which can be utilized to assess all three indicators together (Hermann, 1969, 414-416).
James McCormick distinguishes conceptual approaches to crisis into two schools. The first emphasizes the perception of decision-makers and Charles Hermann is highlighted as the “most representative” of this school. The second one is reliant upon shifting behaviors of states to spot a crisis. McCormick spotted weaknesses in both approaches in how much they diverge when labeling any given situation as a crisis as well as arbitrary constraints in what they define as a crisis. He ends up proposing a combination of the two schools to define a crisis, arguing that it would make a far more efficient approach thanks to their common root goal, a more comprehensive set of indicators for crisis identification and the “increased availability of empirical data” (McCormick, 1978, 352-358).
Refining the Crisis Model: A Synthetic Framework
Instead of following McCormick’s suggestions, Michael Brecher sought to optimize Hermann’s approach. Thus, he outlined the following indicators which define a crisis under the decision-makers’ perception: 1) “threat to basic values” 2) “high probability of involvement in military hostilities” 3) “finite time for their response to the external value threat”. He removed the element of surprise after deeming it insignificant, he defined time for a decision-maker to respond as “finite” and contributed by adding a security-related element to the definition. His initial definition included a fourth condition which was “a change in the internal and external environment” which led to the other three indicators and, consequently, functioned as an external, systemic indicator rather than a perceived one (Brecher, 1977, 42-44).
As Brecher’s theory evolved his concept of crisis became more complex. He defined an international crisis as one where a shift in state interactions with a greater chance of military action influence the international system structurally. He distinguished what constitutes a security crisis, which is more militarily overt, and a foreign policy crisis. He defined a foreign policy crisis using the above-mentioned three indicators while emphasizing its policy-maker perception context. To aid the assessment of a crisis, Brecher proposes four “crisis phases”. The “onset” is where the shift in state interaction occurs marked by the “outbreak”, that is, the increased hostility in the interaction itself. “Escalation” follows as the interaction becomes violent and the probability of military conflict increases, heightening the decision-makers’ sense of threat and pressure. “De-escalation” should follow once hostility, threat and the probability of conflict start declining along with the decision-makers’ stress. The final phase is “impact” which constitutes the ending and effects of any given crisis (Brecher, 2008, 7-12).
Stephen Walt’s balance-of-threat approach can be incorporated into Brecher’s foreign policy crisis concept to enhance the model’s analytic potential. Walt posits that states ally against perceived threats rather than emerging powers alone. He outlines four threat criteria: 1) aggregate power, 2) geographic proximity, 3) offensive capabilities and 4) aggressive intentions. These criteria effectively operationalize Brecher’s first crisis indicator, the “threat to basic values”, as perceived by decision-makers, encompassing risks to core interests like security and sovereignty. Walt’s framework justifies application because Brecher’s indicator relies on subjective perception, mirroring Walt’s holistic threat evaluation. Aggregate power and offensive capabilities provide material grounding for credible threats, proximity adds immediacy, and aggressive intentions capture the perceptual dimension of hostility. This structured approach enhances Brecher’s definition by offering measurable, multidimensional insight into value threats during an international crisis (Walt, 1985, 8-12).
Case Study: US Political Resilience in the Iran 2019-2020 Crisis
For the purposes of applying the outlined model, a case study of the United States’ political resilience during the 2019-2020 Iran crisis will be examined. The crisis under examination takes place during the first Trump administration’s “maximum pressure” policy against Iran, characterized by intense economic sanctions to force it into renegotiation of its nuclear program. The crisis was met with mixed reactions by state actors of the Middle East, but none was remarkable. Meanwhile, both major US allies and foes exercised caution in an attempt to sit out the confrontation. In this case, the lack of reactivity in the international system necessitates a bilateral analysis, thus it enables the current framework by focusing on the US as the decision-maker and on Iran as the adversary (Trenin, 2020).
The crisis’ onset occurred on December 27, 2019 when pro-Iran militia Kataib Hezbollah struck an American base in Northern Iraq. The attack functioned as the crisis’ outbreak due to the unprecedented use of pure hard power, which resulted in one fatality and several injuries among US staff. The US responded promptly after two days following Trump’s briefing by top members of his cabinet. On December 29, the crisis was brought into the phase of escalation because of American military strikes on Kataib Hezbollah targets in Syria and Iraq. The operation successfully eliminated tens of personnel as well as four commanders of the militia, leading to a direct Iranian threat and, consequently, increasing the risk of military hostilities (Moore and Rampton, 2020; Al Jazeera, 2020).
Having spotted Brecher’s second and third indicators, the attack on the American embassy in Baghdad helps in determining the first indicator by evaluating the US’s potential perception of threat to its interests. The event took place on December 31, during which the Popular Mobilization Forces, an umbrella group of Iraqi Shiite militias, stormed the embassy’s outer layers in reaction to the US airstrikes. All throughout the attack President Trump kept informed by several US officials and threatened Iran with retaliation. Later, the US decided to send additional troops to operate in Iraq (Corten et al, 2020, 3; Moore and Rampton, 2020). The clear concern about Iran’s nuclear program reinforces the view that Iran was perceived as having enough aggregate power to develop nuclear weapons. Walt’s second and third criteria were fulfilled on account of Iran’s close proximity to US military installations in Iraq and its ability to attack them using drones and ballistic missiles (Lamrani, 2020). The final criterion, Iran’s hostile intentions, was confirmed by the PMF’s attack. That is, it demonstrated consistency in Iran’s use of proxies against American presence and credibility regarding the direct threat it had made on December 29.
By January 2, 2020, the sense of pressure on US officials was prevalent. They publicly declared their expectation of more Iranian strikes and the willingness of the US to act preemptively against them. On January 3, escalation peaked after the US assassinated Qasem Soleimani, leader of the IRGC’s Quds Force, and Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis, leader of the PMF, in Baghdad. US leadership justified its actions by claiming Soleimani’s responsibility for previous attacks on American targets and future plans of carrying out similar attacks against US diplomatic missions. The probability of military hostilities increased further as Tehran indicated its intentions of retaliating. On January 4, President Trump attempted to deter Iran from taking action by making a counter-threat against Iranian facilities (Moore and Rampton, 2020; Al Jazeera, 2020).
On January 5, Soleimani’s funeral created a rally around the flag phenomenon. The sheer size of the funeral along with the high presence of Shiite symbolism elevated Soleimani’s assassination from a major military loss into a symbol of martyrdom for Iran (Dareini, 2020, 5; Al Jazeera, 2020). Having ensured internal legitimacy to act, Iran announced rolling back from JCPOA’s limitations to its nuclear program on the same day. President Trump reacted promptly on January 6 by simultaneously threatening Tehran and indicating openness to renegotiation of Iran’s nuclear deal. On January 7 Iran went on to increase pressure on US leadership by announcing the consideration of 13 “revenge scenarios” in its National Security Council (Al Jazeera, 2020).
The final stage of the crisis’ escalation phase was the anticipated Iranian reprisal. On January 8 Iran struck two bases in Iraq hosting US personnel with ballistic missiles, Al Asad airbase and one facility in Erbil. Iran’s foreign minister Javad Zarif communicated Tehran’s volition to avoid wider war, while Trump initially downplayed the severity of the event (Kube and Madani, 2020). At this point, the crisis proceeded into the phase of de-escalation since the two contending actors mutually signaled their desire to cease overt violence. Trump accelerated de-escalation via his White House speech on the same day in order to put an end to the crisis. He reiterated the US position on Iran’s nuclear program and announced further measures of economic coercion against Iran (The White House, 2020).
Conclusion
Overall, the United States exhibited substantial political resilience during the 2019-2020 Iran crisis, because core institutions and political authority remained intact despite escalation pressures. Decision-making stayed centralized in the executive branch with Trump containing Iran’s threat through strikes on Kataib Hezbollah, troop deployments after the embassy attack and the assassination of Soleimani. Institutional processes, mainly intelligence briefings and cabinet input, enabled adaptation throughout all phases of the crisis as defined by Brecher. De-escalation occurred quickly after Iran’s January 8 missile strikes, as Trump’s speech prioritized economic measures over continued military action. Domestic strains that might have surfaced were not notable enough to visibly undermine state functionality. Therefore, the American political system adapted effectively, sustaining its structures while managing the external threat posed by Tehran.
Reference List
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Brecher, M. (2008) International Political Earthquakes, The University of Michigan Press, pp.7-12. Available at: https://doczz.net/doc/8537409/conflict-and-crisis—the-university-of-michigan-press (Accessed: February 2026).
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Kube, C. and Madani, D. (2020) Iran retaliates for Gen. Soleimani’s killing by firing missiles at U.S. forces in Iraq, NBC News. Available at: https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/u-s-base-iraq-comes-under-attack-missiles-iran-claims-n1112171 (Accessed: February 2026).
Lamrani, O. (2020) Iran’s Conventional Military Capabilities, New Lines Institute. Available at: https://newlinesinstitute.org/middle-east-center/irans-conventional-military-capabilities/ (Accessed: February 2026).
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Moore, E. and Rampton, R. (2020) Timeline: How The U.S. Came To Strike And Kill A Top Iranian General, NPR. Available at: https://www.npr.org/2020/01/04/793364307/timeline-how-the-u-s-came-to-strike-and-kill-a-top-iranian-general (Accessed: February 2026).
The White House (2020) Remarks by President Trump on Iran, The White House. Available at: https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-iran/ (Accessed: February 2026).
Trenin, D. (2020) A Storm in January: Implications of the Recent U.S.-Iran Crisis for the Global Order, Carnegie Moscow Center. Available at: https://carnegie.ru/commentary/80963 (Accessed: February 2026).
Walt, S. M. (1985) Alliance Formation and the Balance of World Power, International Security 9(4), pp. 8-12. Available at: https://www.jstor.org/stable/2538540 (Accessed: February 2026).
Bibliography
Al Jazeera (2020) US-Iran tensions: Timeline of events leading to Soleimani killing, Al Jazeera. Available at: https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/1/8/us-iran-tensions-timeline-of-events-leading-to-soleimani-killing
Brecher, M. (1977) Toward a Theory of International Crisis Behavior: A Preliminary Report, International Studies Quarterly 21(1), pp. 39-74. Available at: https://www.jstor.org/stable/2600147
Brecher, M. (2008) International Political Earthquakes, The University of Michigan Press. Available at: https://doczz.net/doc/8537409/conflict-and-crisis—the-university-of-michigan-press
Corten, O, Dubuisson, F., Koutroulis, V. and Lagerwall, A. (2020) The Crisis Between Iran, Iraq and the United States in January 2020: What Does International Law Say?, Centre de Droit International ULB. Available at: https://cdi.ulb.ac.be/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/Iran.US_.Iraq_.EN_.Final_-1.pdf
Dareini, A. A. (2020) A Thick Cloud in the US-Iran Climate, Al Jazeera Center for Studies. Available at: https://studies.aljazeera.net/en/reports/thick-cloud-us-iran-climate
Hanumanthappa D. G. (2023) An Overview of David Easton and the Political System, International Journal of Political Science 9(1), pp. 14-16. Available at: https://studylib.net/doc/27748809/an-overview-of-david-easton-and-the-political-system
Hermann, C. F. (1963) Some Consequences of Crisis Which Limit the Viability of Organizations, Administrative Science Quarterly 8(1), pp. 61-82. Available at: https://www.jstor.org/stable/2390887
Hermann, C. F. (1969) International Crisis as a Situational Variable, James N. Rosenau (ed.) International Politics and Foreign Policy, revised edition, New York, N.Y.: Free Press, pp. 409-421. Available at: https://www.academia.edu/105554761/International_Crisis_as_a_Situational_Variable
Kube, C. and Madani, D. (2020) Iran retaliates for Gen. Soleimani’s killing by firing missiles at U.S. forces in Iraq, NBC News. Available at: https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/u-s-base-iraq-comes-under-attack-missiles-iran-claims-n1112171
Lamrani, O. (2020) Iran’s Conventional Military Capabilities, New Lines Institute. Available at: https://newlinesinstitute.org/middle-east-center/irans-conventional-military-capabilities/
McCormick, J. M. (1978) International Crises: A Note on Definition, The Western Political Quarterly 31(3), pp. 352-358. Available at: https://www.jstor.org/stable/447735
Moore, E. and Rampton, R. (2020) Timeline: How The U.S. Came To Strike And Kill A Top Iranian General, NPR. Available at: https://www.npr.org/2020/01/04/793364307/timeline-how-the-u-s-came-to-strike-and-kill-a-top-iranian-general
The White House (2020) Remarks by President Trump on Iran, The White House. Available at: https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-iran/
Trenin, D. (2020) A Storm in January: Implications of the Recent U.S.-Iran Crisis for the Global Order, Carnegie Moscow Center. Available at: https://carnegie.ru/commentary/80963Walt, S. M. (1985) Alliance Formation and the Balance of World Power, International Security 9(4), pp. 3-43. Available at: https://www.jstor.org/stable/2538540
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