

“AI Speed Wars”: How the US and China Are Designing the Future

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Abstract

This article will attempt to analyze the interrelationship between the US and China within the context of Artificial Intelligence (AI) and AI Speed Wars, that has transcend from George Orwell's essay, “The Atomic Bomb and the Danger of War,” that creates the narrative of Cold War within the scope geopolitics, and hostility between superpowers that propagate propaganda, surveillance, fear and suspicion.

Henceforth, there will be a deeper conception of current wars by studying the disposition to control populations, which this article defines as a race to attain technological superiority through quick advances via AI. Our analysis will provide a comparative study of the strategic approaches of the two hegemonies, with emphasis on US innovation in private sector leadership, for the preservation of supremacy, relative to China's focus on state-backed projects, amalgamation of military and civilian AI applications with robust national policies also targeted towards AI supremacy by 2030.

Moreover, there will be an attempt to underline how the development of weaponry creates ramifications on economic dominance, military capabilities, bilateral and multilateral relations, which could reverse these two foci of power via their growth and influence.

Therefore, by mapping out the framework of US-China and the Future, our paper will illustrate why current AI Speed Wars could replace George Orwell's Cold War.

Keywords: Artificial Intelligence (AI), AI Speed Wars, U.S.-China Competition, International Relations, Technology

Key Points:

- Analysis of the transition from the Cold War to AI Speed Wars

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- *What does this mean on a global scale*
- *How does this change the balance of bilateral and multilateral relations*
- *The possible scenarios of speed and technology*

Introduction

In the modern geopolitical landscape, the race for supremacy in Artificial Intelligence (AI) has become a decisive battleground, where its reference does not lie solely within the concept of technology, but in speed at which nations develop, deploy and scale AI systems. Many countries compete to achieve an advantage in AI innovation within the global scope, comprehending the gravity of AI. This further promotes competitiveness, that increases productivity, protects national security that both assist in establishing sustainable solutions to challenges within the public sphere (Meleouni, 2021). Studies have shown that the United States and the People's Republic of China are both determined to leverage the landscape to develop their Artificial Intelligence, that has become a national priority pursued at the highest governmental level. Both state actors have underscored the importance of technology through the realm of economic development, national security and international competition (Wang & Chen, 2018).

Interestingly, the Cold War's origin is deeply rooted within the contrasting political and economic principles written in Carl Marx's and Friedrich Engels' "*Communist Manifesto*" (Marx, 1848) and, Adam Smith's "*The Wealth of Nations*" (Smith A. , 1776). In a more comprehensive context, the theoretical dichotomy contributed to George Orwell's wider philosophical views that further analyzed the history of civilization as one being driven by development and weapon proliferation (Orwell, *The Atomic Bomb*, 1945). This sequentially was expediated in his analysis in *1984* of capitalism and communism (Orwell, 1984, 1954). On November 9, 1989, the world witnessed the end of communism for the East and the rise of capitalism for the West. Comparatively, unlike the *Cold War* that was shaped by fundamental ideologies of governance and societal organization, *AI Speed Wars* elucidate Orwell's narrative, particularly in relation to control, ethical deployment, and the fervent promotion of safety (Orwell, *The Atomic Bomb*, 1945) . Henceforth, the absence of the philosophical doctrines makes the motives behind *AI Speed Wars* pragmatic and future outcomes uncertain and their results challenging to determine.

Scholars have indeed argued that a new *AI Cold War* is evolving on the global stage between the world's two superpowers (Taneja & Zakaria, 2023), (Takach, 2024). However, as

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previously expressed our paper is attempting to demonstrate the divergence of contemporary wars between these powers, and the narrative of traditional *Cold War* to that of *AI Speed Wars*.

Notably, until recently, the United States and the People's Republic of China, had a *Kantian* approach to maintain a type of *perpetual peace*. This was done by engaging in economic interactions through trade and global supply chains, (Smith G. H., 2016), (Siripurapu & Berman, 2024). However, current escalating trade wars between the two countries-imposed US tariffs at 145% respectively China's at 125% (Jamie Whitehead, 2025) thus, exemplifying a *new mercantilism* into the global economy (Economy, 2025). Nonetheless, current talks of ninety day pause negotiations are rekindling the *Kantian* approach of reconciliation (Leonard, 2025). Henceforth, this will reestablish their economic interdependence which in effect may reignite previous competition and create new challenges to Sino-American autonomy.

This article will aim to examine this emerging technological competition, by outlining the key strategies employed by the great powers, where both the US and the Peoples' Republic of China are vying in control over the future of AI development, and the global economy.

U.S. Strategy in Artificial Intelligence (AI): Leadership through Innovation

Emphatically, the United States has perceived the strategic advantages of AI and, within this scope has proactively implemented the necessary measures to strengthen its leadership within the global competition of supremacy. Henceforth, the country maintains its hegemony within the realm of strategic systems, where innovation has neatly been crafted into regulations to protect both military applications and privacy security so as to sustain its technological hegemony.

The US has long been a global leader in technological innovation especially in the field of AI. Specifically, Silicon Valley, which is the global powerhouse to technological transformation, hosts the forefront of digital giants such as Google, Microsoft and OpenAI.

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Each of these pioneering titans champion cutting edge research and development, thus redefining the boundaries of AI capabilities while also shaping global trends and standards.

For decades, the US military and security sector have been integrating advanced technology into weapon systems. Autonomous drones, surveillance systems, and AI-powered decision assistance are just a few examples of how advancements in civilian AI are directly influencing military innovation (Kreps, 2024). AI is being used by the US for cybersecurity, intelligence collection, autonomous weapon systems, and predictive analytics as part of its defense and national security initiatives. To ensure ethical use, the US military is concentrating on incorporating AI into its defensive systems while keeping a human-in-the-loop approach to decision-making (Sayler, 2020).

In 2018, in alignment with the National Defense Strategy (NDS), the Department of Defense (DoD) established the Joint Artificial Intelligence Center (JAIC) which published the *AI Strategy* with the purpose to refine and upscale its impact. This was done through a common framework to further enhance development and create a top-tier technological workforce in collaboration with academic, and international allies and partners, with leadership in military ethics and AI security systems (Department of Defense, 2018).

In January 2025, the White House published the executive order, “*Removing Barriers to American Leadership in Artificial Intelligence*” with an aim to strengthen US. leadership in the field of AI. The Order recognized the country’s hegemony in the discipline of technology and innovation, which was attributed to Adam Smith’s classical economic model of free markets within the context to enhance AI leadership and the removal of barriers in the likes of, tariffs, restrictions and/or over-regulation. This was done with the purpose to support competition and free exchange of technological advancement (Smith A. , 1776). Within this realm, the Order upheld research institutions, and the country’s entrepreneurial perspective. Moreover, it was also understood that, to ensure America’s hierarchy in Artificial Intelligence all innovation needed to be within a space of free ideological bias and/or social agendas. Additionally, the Executive Order repealed previous policies and guidelines that were considered barriers to US innovation in AI, to maintain its global leadership. Consequently, it also established an action plan to implement the above policy by encompassing more government officials, and agencies (The White House, 2025).

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Henceforth, for years, US academic institutions specifically, the Massachusetts Institute of Technology(MIT), Stanford University and Harvard University, all had an integral role in the development of Artificial Intelligence. Specifically, MIT, widely known for its Computer Science and Artificial Intelligence Laboratory (CSAIL), developed its cutting-edge technologies by collaborating with leading companies in this field (MIT CSAIL, 2025). Furthermore, in 2017, the Institutes' partnership with IBM created the MIT-IBM Watson AI Lab that consisted of scientists from MIT and IBM aimed towards pushing the boundaries of Artificial Intelligence by translating their findings into real-world impact (MIT-IBM Watson AI Lab, 2025), (Ravipati, 2017). Furthermore, Stanford University, which lies at the heart of Silicon Valley, connected its academic research with the industry, by supporting start-up companies and fostering partnerships. This synergy further promoted technological innovation through the highly respected and advanced research facility of Stanford Artificial Intelligence Laboratory(SAIL) founded in 1963 by Professor John McCarthy⁹² (Stanford Artificial Intelligence Lab(SAIL), 2025).

Significantly, San Francisco's Silicon Valley is the hub for industrial giants such as Google, Apple, Facebook and Tesla. Notably, each one of these dominant cooperation are currently spearheading investment initiatives in development and implementation of Artificial Intelligence. Each are a gateway for ventures to enter start-up incubators with the purpose to fuel robust AI solutions through large funding to talented engineers and researchers within the network of these start-up incubators. (Kushida, 2024).

When it comes to creating AI-powered apps for cloud computing, e-commerce, banking, healthcare, and entertainment, the US continues to lead the world (Kreps, 2024). Technological development is rapid, with new models appearing every few months that can understand, create and logically process ever better. The cost of AI training is falling, while computing power is increasing, accelerating innovation. A prime example is the further development of GPT by OpenAI, where in less than 5 years we have gone from GPT-2 to GPT-4, a multimodal model that can process text, images and audio in real time, making it

⁹² John McCarthy was a mathematician and important figure in the field of theoretical computing, who in 1971 received the Turing Prize for his significant contributions to the contributions to the field of Artificial Intelligence (Professor John McCarthy Father of AI, 2025).

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accessible to a wide range of applications (Kapuściński, 2024), (Altman, 2025). Amazon is also working on "Kiro", a tool that uses AI to automate software development, reduce coding time and improve developer productivity (Anderson, 2025).

According to an April 2023 EU report the United States develops 73% of key language models, while China only 15%. American leadership is further confirmed by Stanford's Global Vibrancy Tool, which breaks down AI patents, investments, and publications by nation. It also predicts that in 2023, the US will draw far more private investment in AI than China (\$67.2 billion to \$7.8 billion). Moreover, American dominance in AI could be said to be the result of a synergistic collaboration between academia, industry and government. Interestingly, innovation together with academic theories, and practical applications have played a pivotal role in rapid developments. Additionally, venture capital funding in Silicon Valley is unquestionably accelerating the process of growth and emerging technologies. Remarkably, the US has the largest share of global investment in AI, positioning it as a pioneer, and leader in development technology worldwide.

The Chinese Strategy: Acceleration with State Support

The development of technology has become a national priority for the People's Republic of China that it actively and persistently pursues. Eminently, its ambitions in AI have been promoted by the National Central Government, local governments, AI-related patents, research articles, and rapidly growing ecosystem of AI applications. (Conroy, 2024). Interestingly, in 2015 the Chinese government launched its competitive strategic plan, *Made in China 2025* to spearhead its scientific advancement and economic growth to further accelerate the country's global technological leadership, (Conroy, 2024). Moreover, in 2017 the nation presented another national strategy, the *China AI Plan (Next Generation Artificial Intelligence Plan)*, which aimed to position the country's global dominance in Artificial Intelligence by 2030 (Khanal, 2024). Emphatically, China sees technological advancement as a critical instrument for increasing its global competitiveness and national security (Olugbade, 2024).

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Mara Hvistendahl in an interview with the leading expert on Chinese surveillance, Dr. Samantha Hoffman, for the MIT Technology Review, discussed how the Chinese Communist Party, in the role of the “sleeping agent,” aggregates data within the country in the form of texts, images, videos, and audios. Dr. Hoffman further analyzed the CCP’s accesses to global data, expressing that they use state-owned corporations, Chinese and foreign technological firms, and university researchers. Moreover, she emphasized that the collection of data helps to understand patterns and trends that assist in translating human behavior. Consequently, the “sleeping agent” then uses this information to decipher intelligence, propaganda, and surveillance. Often, this data is fed into tools in the likes of, the social credit system, while the big data such as, images, and voice information are used to further train algorithms for facial and voice identity. (Hoffman, 2019), (Hvistendahl, 2020). Interestingly, some of the foreign entities which play the role of the “trojan horse” that aggregate malignant data are, TikTok, DeepSeek AI, GTCOM Technology Corporation. Unquestionably, one could argue that collection of information is a popular tool used by many western societies to globally market their products. However, the casing point in relation to China, is that data collection is done through the Chinese Communist Party, in way of *Cold War* tactics described in the military doctrine, Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) 1950. Notably, Marxist Historian Eric Hobsbawm in his work the “Age of Extremes” described the *Cold War* period as one shaped by fear and nuclear annihilation, (Hobsbawm, 1995). Currently, the trajectory of the MAD doctrine is now defined as AI and speed, where China’s “sleeping agent” weighs in on the western economic model of capitalism through the country’s foreign entities in the likes of, Baidu, Alibaba, Tencent and Huawei, to gather data that will help its nation disrupt democracies and in turn, create a global environment to spearhead their universal supremacy (De Roucy-Rochegonde & Buffard, 2025), (Wang & Chen, 2018).

Interestingly, one of China's strongest strategies is the military-political integration known is the Civil-Military Integration (CMI) and the development of advanced dual-use technologies. The Chinese government has openly expressed that advanced technology is *a matter of crucial importance for the future of global military and economic power competition,*’ (Allen G. , 2019). Furthermore, central government believes that emerging technologies will shape and accelerate the pace of warfare, in that any future military success will require forces that

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are mechanized, information-driven, and intelligent; namely, AI-based technologies (Horowitz & Kahn, 2021).

Notably, when examining China's AI military applications, it is important to note the country's limited war experience. Henceforth, China mainly targets virtual war games and augmented reality-based simulations. (Kania, 2019). One of the most well-known examples of simulations is the AI and War-Gaming National Finals, 2017 that was hosted by the China Institute of Command and Control, where humans faced machines operated without human control, known as CASIA-Prophet 1.0., where the machines won (Kania & McCaslin, 2021, p. 21).

War-gaming and simulations are considered by the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) as tools to improve and optimize the use of AI in military applications that will help China succeed in a future war. However, this is just a small part of the military AI applications China has achieved so far. The lack of real combat experience has not hindered the nation from researching and testing the application of AI in autonomous unmanned systems, for both defense and offence, as well as supporting decision-making by the command with AI (Kania & McCaslin, 2021, pp. 8-10).

With emphasis on useful industrial applications rather than consumer-facing technologies, China is giving Artificial Intelligence and related advancements top priority to increase industrial efficiency and economic growth, particularly in manufacturing and automation. Additionally, there have been significant investments in industrial and humanoid robots to help solve a declining workforce, surpassing both Japan and the United States in robot deployment. However, China is also boosting national R&D investment by 10% to improve basic research and technology skills after realizing its shortcomings in original invention (Dohmen, 2024).

The emergence of DeepSeek is an important example of China's rapid progress in AI and raises questions about the global distribution of power in this technology. DeepSeek's success has shown that innovation and competition in the field of AI is rapidly intensifying. DeepSeek is a free AI chatbot app, similar to ChatGPT, and has attracted interest as DeepSeek R1 was developed at a significantly lower cost compared to Western counterparts

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and led to a decline in the share value of US tech companies such as Nvidia, raising concerns about US dominance in the AI sector (Ng, Drenon, Gerken, & Cieslak, 2025)

Notably, China's long-term AI plan is backed by adaptable laws and strong infrastructure, which further encourages sustainable growth by integrating AI into industries including manufacturing, healthcare, and energy. This gives the country an opportunity to demonstrate to other nations how to coordinate a strategy for innovation and implement it into policy. China maintains its global digital footprint having in its capacity more than 4,300 technological enterprises, and with the full support of the Bank of China which intends to invest a staggering amount of over one trillion Renminbi (RMB) in over the next five years to promote startup companies in AI. Interestingly, this comprises one of many examples as how the Chinese government plays a significant financial role to support robust technological advancements (CBaN Editor, 2025).

A Comparative Assessment of US and China in Technological Supremacy

The US, China and AI are redefining the concept of global disputes. Both countries, as mentioned in the previous sections, have established the paramount importance of AI for economic development, national security, military sovereignty and global conflicts as a national priority (Wang & Chen, 2018).

The US has accelerated its own AI-related defense programs in response to China's AI-driven military capabilities, which include cyberwarfare tools and autonomous systems. More precisely, China's military is making significant investments in AI for both defense and intelligence objectives under the leadership of the People's Liberation Army (PLA). AI is thought to be crucial to China's modernization of combat, especially in fields like cyberwarfare, AI-powered surveillance, and autonomous drones (Nelson & Epstein, 2022), (Baptista, 2022). Furthermore, these technologies could be used for military objectives, such as real-time enemy tracking. In addition, the Chinese government is making significant investments in AI as part of its goal to counter the technological edge enjoyed by the US

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military. This encompasses initiatives aimed at creating military robots, AI for predictive analytics in combat, and driverless military vehicles (U.S Department of Defense , 2024).

The US has expressed that to achieve technological leadership crucial is education, private companies and the public sector. Although, to be able to limit China's development of AI, the US has made restrictions and sanctions against Chinese technology companies, for example Huawei and TikTok. In particular, the U.S. has raised concerns about the risks that may arise from China's growing technological power such as 5G networks and AI where it may have both civilian and military uses, which poses security challenges. In addition, the structure of the Chinese state and its ability to influence domestic companies raises concerns about possible exploitation of technologies for state purposes. (Williams, 2020)

Since 2017, Congress has enacted laws restricting the use of Huawei equipment in Department of Defense networks that prohibited federal agencies from procuring equipment or services using Huawei products as there were concerns about that company's ties to the Chinese government and military, with unfair trade practices and the risk of espionage or sabotage through its networks. In addition, in 2019, the U.S. Department of Justice accused Huawei and its executives of financial fraud and sanctions violations. Furthermore, in 2020, the U.S. strengthened restrictions by limiting Huawei's access to semiconductors produced with U.S. technologies and Congress appropriated \$1.9 billion to remove Huawei equipment from US networks. Even the Biden administration-maintained restrictions imposed by the previous administration and strengthened restrictions on sales of semiconductors for 5G devices (Gallagher, 2022). The confrontation with Huawei reflects the broader competition between the U.S. and China for leadership in technology and innovation. However, in addition to the technological competition, there are implications of U.S.-China trade tensions on global technology supply chains as restrictions and tariffs imposed by the two countries affect production, distribution and innovation in the technology sector(Nguyen, 2022).

When it comes to creating AI-powered apps for cloud computing, e-commerce, banking, healthcare, and entertainment, the U.S. continues to lead the world (Kreps, 2024). AI can flourish in the U.S. tech sector because of its worldwide reach, startup culture, and venture

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money. This environment encourages competition, which spurs additional innovation and keeps the U.S. ahead in other AI-related sectors like healthcare and finance.

Consequently, China's emphasis on AI is thought to be a key component of its future economic expansion. The Chinese government is investing heavily in AI and smart manufacturing, and in certain AI-driven businesses, it has already risen to the top of the world economy. Additionally, China's efforts to shift from a manufacturing-based economy to a knowledge-based economy heavily rely on AI. The government is encouraging the application of AI in fields like public services, e-commerce, smart cities, and transportation. The rapid expansion of businesses that install face recognition software, AI-powered cameras, and other tracking devices in urban settings is a result of China's dominance in AI-driven surveillance technologies (Triolo & Schaefer, 2024).

Recently, a major agreement between the United States and Saudi Arabia in the field of AI was announced in May 2025, during US President Donald Trump's tour of the Middle East. As part of the agreement, Nvidia announced the sale of 18,000 advanced AI processors(Blackwell GPUs) to Humain, which will be used in a new 500megawatt data center. AMD signed a \$10 billion deal to develop AI infrastructure, while Qualcomm agreed to co-develop a data center with Humain. In addition, Amazon Web Services plans to invest \$5 billion to create an "AI Zone" in Saudi Arabia, and DataVolt, a Saudi company, will invest \$20 billion in data centers in the US. The deal reflects Saudi Arabia's strategy to diversify its economy beyond oil by investing in cutting-edge technologies and strengthening its position as a global player in the field of AI(Cherney & Nellis, 2025), (Amazon Staff, 2025).

However, through programs like the Belt and Road Initiative(BRI), which involves exporting AI technologies produced in China to other nations, mainly in Asia and Africa, China is aggressively advancing its goal for AI development. China frequently exports AI technologies with less focus on privacy protections and ethical standards, enabling underdeveloped countries to use AI solutions that might not follow the same moral guidelines advocated by Western nations. Beijing's strategy for AI governance, however, places a strong emphasis on state surveillance and control, which may be a template for other authoritarian governments looking to keep their populace under control(Sahin, 2020).

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Consequently, the U.S. is committed to safeguarding intellectual property (IP) and limiting access to cutting-edge AI technologies for nations like China that it views as national security concerns. The goal of US policies, such as export restrictions on AI technologies and components, is to restrict China's access to vital AI infrastructure. However, by creating its own AI hardware and software, China is attempting to lessen its dependency on American technology. It is making investments to build an autonomous AI ecosystem that may one day challenge American leadership in the area(Allen & Goldston, 2025).

Nevertheless, AI innovation and research are not just the prerogative of the U.S. and China, but of other countries too. In its National AI Strategy, the UK government has announced a plan to increase AI computing power 20-fold by 2030, including the creation of a new supercomputer and a national data library(Milmo, 2025), (Kyle, Starmer, & Reeves, 2025). In addition to that, there are several institutes such as the AI Safety Institute (AIS), which was founded in 2023 with funding of £100 million to assess the risks of new AI models and work with companies such as OpenAI and Google DeepMind(AI Security Institute, 2025),(Centre for Future Generations, 2024). Also, France has invested over €2.5 billion in AI research and technology since 2018, with the aim of boosting innovation and attractiveness(Menardeau, 2025).

Another country investing in AI is Germany, which is a pioneer in the integration of AI into industrial production with a high density of robots and smart factories which has the highest density of robots in Europe, making it an attractive center for investment in automation(International Trade Administration, 2024). Also, Israel which is investing in cybersecurity, with a focus on protecting AI systems with the startup AI21 Labs developing large-scale language models, with investments from Nvidia, Google and others totaling \$636 million(Mazza, 2025). Finally, South Korea plans to invest 527 million dollars in 69 sectors to develop AI(Byung-yeul, 2024) while India has the fastest growing developer community in the world, with 15 million developers, and hosts 25% of AI projects on GitHub^[1](Anand, 2024).

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The competition between the United States and China in the field of artificial intelligence is one of the main axes of the global technology race, with both countries investing enormous resources to gain a strategic advantage. However, the global dynamics in AI have begun to shift as more countries increase their investments and develop innovative applications and research programs. Although the US and China remain the dominant powers, the global AI scene is becoming increasingly multi-centric, suggesting that the future of AI will be characterized by multi-layered international competition and collaboration.

[1] Developers can write, store, manage, and distribute their code using GitHub, a proprietary platform. GitHub itself offers access control, bug tracking, software feature requests, task management, continuous integration, and wikis for each project, while Git is used to provide distributed version control (GitHub, 2025).

Conclusions

Further to the conflict of technology, AI Speed Wars change the dynamics within the realm of global influence. Speed is a primary component in the pelt; henceforth, the country that will subjugate this acceleration will be capable of shaping further generations. Therefore, as AI constantly increases in speed, the challenge becomes two-fold. Specifically, who will prevail, and what paradigm will be formed in the perchance that AI becomes a global force, which in turn will diverge from the traditional Cold War discourse.

Global relations are changing, especially when consideration the new variable of AI Speed Wars amid China and the U.S. Notably, China is currently driving AI research through a state-driven approach with ambitious regulations and significant investments; while on the other hand, the U.S. is mostly focused on utilizing its academic institutions and private sector to maintain its technological advantage. This rivalry transcends the scope of technological dominance, particularly, by increasing the foundation for future military and economic supremacy.

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One possibility is, either the US or China, could perhaps gain control in the AI landscape, which eventually could have paramount implications especially, in its influence in the global economy, and military strategies. On the flipside, there is the potential that AI may help mold the cooperative framework, that will reshape these superpowers' bilateral and power relations into one where, both countries could collectively address global challenges, thus providing solutions both on a domestic and global level which would also encompass job displacement, security risks and ethical concerns.

Power relations, between the US and China, provide a space to observe the formation of the future of global technology. Hence, as both countries continue to engage in the encounter for supremacy, global actors and citizens become witnesses of the transcendence of George Orwell's account of Cold War discourse, engaging the new paradigm of weaponry via technological enterprises, further fortifying the struggle of worldwide influence enroute to AI advances. The outcome of such a rivalry will determine the next technological age of AI Speed Wars and the plunge into unforeseen dangers, or perhaps the potential of artificial intelligence to help mold the cooperative framework between these two superpowers.

In the past few years, the landscape of global technological competition has been significantly reshaped by the rapid advancement of AI, as well as the dynamics of international power. As it has become evident through the strategic rivalry between the United States and the People's Republic of China in the domain of AI, there is a fundamental shift in geopolitical paradigms. Unlike the ideological confrontations of the Cold War era, today's "AI Speed Wars" main characteristics are those of strategic pragmatism, accelerated innovation, and the pursuit of technological dominance through distinct national models.

Ultimately, AI is emerging not only as a transformative technology but also as a geopolitical instrument with far-reaching implications. The outcome of the AI Speed Wars, whether they lead to increased confrontation or to a new era of collaborative governance, will most likely shape the trajectory of international relations and the future global order for decades to come.

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Βιογραφικό Σημείωμα Christina D. Meleouni:

Ms. Christina D. Meleouni is Political Scientist and International Relations expert. She studied Political Science at the University of Crete and continued her postgraduate studies at the University of the Peloponnese in the Department of Political Science and International Relations, specifically in the Master's program "Global Risks and Analytics." Also, she pursued further studies at Panteion University in the Department of International, European, and Area Studies in the Master's program "International Relations and Strategic Studies," from which she graduated with distinction.

In addition, she is a PhD candidate at Panteion University in the Department of International, European, and Area Studies. Her doctoral research focuses on the application of AI in the armed forces and its impact on the international distribution of power.

Finally, since 2018, she has been a junior researcher at the Institute of International Relations (IIR) at Panteion University and a member of the Hellenic Association of Political Scientists (HAPSc).

Βιογραφικό Σημείωμα Χριστίνα Γιάννου:

Η κυρία Χριστίνα Γιάννου έχει σπουδάσει Πολιτικές Επιστήμες και Διεθνείς Σχέσεις σε προπτυχιακό επίπεδο και κατέχει μεταπτυχιακό δίπλωμα στη Διακυβέρνηση από τη Σχολή Ευρωπαϊκού Δικαίου και Διακυβέρνησης (European Law and Governance School - ELGS).

Είναι ερευνήτρια με εξειδίκευση στη εξωτερική πολιτική και άμυνα. Σύμφωνα με τον κανονισμό του γραφείου του Ευρωπαϊκού Κοινοβουλίου, είναι εγγεγραμμένη στο Μητρώο Διαφάνειας της ΕΕ με αριθμό καταχώρισης N° N006W2S0.

Η επαγγελματική της εμπειρία περιλαμβάνει συνεργασίες με τις πρεσβείες της Βρετανίας, της Νιγηρίας, της Ιορδανίας, της Ταϊπέι και της Ταϊλάνδης, γεγονός που της επέτρεψε να αποκτήσει πολύτιμες γνώσεις για τις διεθνείς διπλωματικές πρακτικές και να εμβαθύνει στην κατανόηση της πολυπλοκότητας των παγκόσμιων σχέσεων.

Αυτή την περίοδο, είναι επιμελήτρια της αγγλόφωνης ηλεκτρονικής εφημερίδας του Πρώτου Θέματος, όπου συνδυάζει την εμπειρία της στην έρευνα και τη συγγραφή για να παρέχει ενημερωμένη και τεκμηριωμένη κάλυψη διεθνών ζητημάτων. Παράλληλα, στον Ελληνικό Οργανισμό των Πολιτικών Επιστημόνων της δίνεται η δυνατότητα να εξερευνεί σύνθετα ζητήματα σχετικά με την εξωτερική πολιτική της ΕΕ, την ενεργειακή ασφάλεια και τις

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εξελισσόμενες γεωπολιτικές δυναμικές στην Ανατολική Μεσόγειο. Μέσω της έρευνας, επιδιώκει να συμβάλει στην κατανόηση των βασικών παγκόσμιων προκλήσεων, συμπεριλαμβανομένων των επιπτώσεων της κλιματικής αλλαγής, της πράσινης μετάβασης και των στρατηγικών ανακατατάξεων στις διεθνείς συμμαχίες. Έχει συγγράψει άρθρα και πολιτικές αναλύσεις εξετάζοντας θέματα όπως η Πράσινη Συμφωνία της ΕΕ και οι επιπτώσεις της στις βιώσιμες ενεργειακές λύσεις.

Το 2022, δημοσίευσε μια πολιτική ανάλυση για τη στρατηγική «Από το Αγρόκτημα στο Πιάτο» της ΕΕ, η οποία προσέλκυσε την προσοχή ιδρυμάτων όπως το Ινστιτούτο Επιστήμης Εδάφους και Καλλιέργειας Φυτών στην Πολωνία. Το ενδιαφέρον της έχει επεκταθεί επίσης στις σχέσεις ΕΕ-Τουρκίας, όπου ανέλυσε τις αβεβαιότητες στο διπλωματικό τοπίο και τις επιπτώσεις των περιφερειακών συγκρούσεων. Επιπλέον, η έρευνά της εξετάζει τις προκλήσεις ενεργειακής ασφάλειας που θέτει η σύγκρουση Ρωσίας-Ουκρανίας και τις προσπάθειες της ΕΕ να σταθεροποιήσει τις ενεργειακές αγορές μέσω πρωτοβουλιών όπως το σχέδιο REPowerEU.

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-ΤΕΛΟΣ ΤΕΥΧΟΥΣ-